years), and 79 (88%) of the victims were male. Of those persons who died, 53 (59%) were occupational pilots. Mean total flight hours (when available) for pilots in command (n = 43) was 7,798 hours. The most common occupations of the nonpilot victims were management (11); installation, service, and repair (seven); personal care/service occupations, including tour guides (six); and protective service occupations (four). Fixed wing aircraft were involved in 48 (89%) of the crashes and six (11%) involved helicopters. Most (65%) crashes occurred during May-September; 48% of crashes occurred during the hours of 12:01 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
Occupational Aviation Fatalities -Alaska, 2000-2010
Aircraft crashes are the second leading cause of occupational deaths in Alaska; during the 1990s, a total of 108 fatal aviation crashes resulted in 155 occupational fatalities (1) . To update data and identify risk factors for occupational death from aircraft crashes, CDC reviewed data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Alaska Occupational Injury Surveillance System. During 2000-2010, a total of 90 occupational fatalities occurred as a result of 54 crashes, an average of five fatal aircraft crashes and eight fatalities per year. Among those crashes, 21 (39%) were associated with intended takeoffs or landings at landing sites not registered with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Fifteen crashes (28%) were associated with weather, including poor visibility, wind, and turbulence. In addition, 11 crashes (20%) resulted from pilots' loss of aircraft control; nine (17%) from pilots' failure to maintain clearance from terrain, water, or objects; and seven (13%) from engine, structure, or component failure. To reduce occupational fatalities resulting from aircraft crashes in the state, safety interventions should focus on providing weather and other flight information to increase pilots' situational awareness, maintaining pilot proficiency and decision-making abilities, and expanding the infrastructure used by pilots to fly by instruments.
CDC reviewed reports from its Alaska Occupational Injury Surveillance System (AOISS) and information from the NTSB accident database* to identify risk factors for occupational deaths. A case was defined as a fatal occupational traumatic injury in an aircraft crash during 2000-2010 that was reported in Alaska and investigated by NTSB. AOISS contains information on all fatal occupational traumatic injuries that occur in Alaska. Only cases that meet the criteria for an occupational fatality using established guidelines for injury at work are included (2) . NTSB is mandated by Congress to investigate civilian transportation incidents and crashes, determine probable causes, and issue safety recommendations. NTSB reports include information on aircraft, crash circumstances, pilots and crew, and a narrative outlining contributing factors. Crashes are "accidents," defined by the NTSB as "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage." † Military crashes and crashes of aircraft that are not registered in a civil aviation registry (such as ultralights) routinely are not investigated.
Rates for the number of departures were calculated using data from the FAA Terminal Area Forecast summary report for the Alaska region for 2000-2010. § FAA air traffic control towers and radar approach control facilities record aircraft operations (takeoffs and landings). Aircraft operations at contracted air traffic control towers and nontowered airports are estimated. For this report, the number of departures was calculated as operations (takeoffs + landings) divided by two. Failure to maintain clearance from terrain, water, or obstacles 9 12
Engine, structural, or component failure, including known deficiencies 7 11
Failure to use appropriate landing gear 2 6 Failure to follow published instrument procedures 2 2 Failure to supervise student pilot 1 1 Undetermined or aircraft missing 3 5 National Transportation Safety Board report not complete 4 10 and the FAA Circle of Safety program helps educate passengers on their responsibilities for safe flight (5) . The Medallion Foundation is a nonprofit organization created to raise safety standards and foster a culture of safety among operators and pilots.** In the 1990s, NIOSH determined that crashes into terrain and flying from good weather into conditions of poor visibility were strongly associated (6) . Interventions developed as part of AIASI focused on improving the industry's safety culture and provided tools to avoid flight into poor visibility conditions. These various interventions have been effective in reducing fatalities (3); however, adverse weather continues to be a risk factor for fatal crashes. Loss of control, failure to maintain clearance, and aircraft structure or component failure also are risk factors. Crashes resulting from loss of aircraft control, failure to maintain clearance from terrain and objects, failure of aircraft structure and components, failure to follow published procedures, and improper use of landing gear might be associated with pilot proficiency and decision making. Crashes since 2000 commonly were associated with flights to or from non-FAA-registered landing sites. These locations often are in remote areas of Alaska having limited weather information and minimal or no emergency equipment. Alaska's vast area, lack of roads, mountainous terrain, adverse weather conditions, and limited coverage by air traffic control, plus the use of airstrips and nonestablished landing fields, increase flight safety risks. Continued safety interventions that increase access to weather information, pilot proficiency, and instrument flight capabilities are needed to contend with the unique flying hazards found in Alaska.
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, departure data were used as a denominator to measure flight activity, but these data are not a precise representation of worker exposure. The number of flight hours logged by workers traveling as part of their job or to their jobsites would give more precise measure of worker exposure. Second, departure data are obtained through reports to air traffic control towers and radar approach control facilities and estimated for nontowered airports included in FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS). Operations at non-FAA-registered landing sites and airports not listed in NPIAS are not included in the estimates. ** Information available at http://www.medallionfoundation.org.
In October 2010, approximately 200 members of the Alaska aviation community met to acknowledge the seriousness of the increased number of crashes in 2010, to explore solutions, and to identify resources to advance aviation safety in Alaska. Six vital items were identified by workgroups and persons at the meeting: pilot proficiency, access to weather information, Capstone avionics equipment, runway maintenance, fuel availability, and increased infrastructure support for instrument flight navigation (7) . Further safety interventions should continue to focus on providing weather and other information to increase pilots' situational awareness, maintaining pilot proficiency and decision-making ability regardless of experience, ratings and flight hours, and providing infrastructure to allow pilots to fly by instruments.
What is already known on this topic?
Aircraft crashes are the second leading cause of occupational fatalities in Alaska.
What is added by this report?
Occupational aviation safety in Alaska has improved, with the fatal crash rate decreasing 32% from the first to the second half of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The higher than average number of crashes in 2010 call for continued efforts to identify risk factors, develop interventions, and promote safety. The most frequent causes of fatal occupational aircraft crashes include encounters with weather, pilots' loss of aircraft control, failure to maintain clearance from terrain, and aircraft structure or component failure.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Safety interventions should continue to focus on providing weather information and improving pilots' situational awareness, and on enhancing airport infrastructure to allow pilots with appropriate equipment and experience to fly by instruments; proficiency in piloting skills and aeronautical decision making should be emphasized for pilots regardless of experience, ratings, and flight hours.
Adult Blood Lead Epidemiology and Surveillance -United States, 2008-2009
Lead exposure can result in acute or chronic adverse effects in multiple organ systems, ranging from subclinical changes in function to symptomatic, life-threatening toxicity. Despite improvements in public health policies and substantial reductions in blood lead levels (BLLs) in adults, lead exposure remains an important health problem worldwide. Approximately 95% of all elevated BLLs reported among adults in the United States are work-related (1), and recent research has raised concerns regarding the toxicity of BLLs as low as 5 µg/dL (2, 3 The results of that analysis indicated that a decline in the prevalence of elevated BLLs (≥25 µg/dL) was extended, from 14.0 per 100,000 employed adults in 1994 to 6.3 in 2009. Industry subsectors with the highest numbers of lead-exposed workers were battery manufacturing, secondary smelting and refining of nonferrous metals, and painting and paper hanging. The most common nonoccupational exposures to lead were shooting firearms; remodeling, renovating, or painting; retained bullets (gunshot wounds); and lead casting. The findings underscore the need for government agencies, employers, public health professionals, health-care providers, and worker-affiliated organizations to increase interventions to prevent workplace lead exposure, and the importance of conducting lead exposure surveillance to assess the effectiveness of these interventions.
State ABLES programs 1) collect data on adult BLLs from laboratories and physicians through mandatory reporting requirements; 2) assign unique identifiers to each adult to account for multiple BLL records; 3) follow-up on adults with BLLs ≥25 µg/dL with laboratories, health-care providers, employers, or workers to ensure completeness of information (e.g., the industry where the adult is employed and whether the exposure source is occupational, nonoccupational, or both); and 4) code the industry where the adult worked using the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or the 2002 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The requirement for laboratories and health-care providers to notify state authorities about BLLs varies among ABLES states, ranging from the reporting of all BLLs to only BLLs ≥40 µg/dL.* Most ABLES states submit data on all BLLs to CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), including records from adults whose BLLs fall below the state reporting requirement.
Adults were defined as persons aged ≥16 years. For adults with more than one BLL record in a given year, only the highest BLL was included. Elevated BLLs were defined as blood lead concentrations ≥25µg/dL. Prevalence numerators were either "state residents" (adults residing in the reporting state) or "state residents and nonresidents" (all adults reported by a state) with elevated BLLs (a distinction in the data since 2002); both employed and unemployed persons were included in the numerators. Denominators were the annual employed population aged ≥16 years for the period [2008] [2009] (Table) . Industry subsectors with the greatest proportions of adults with BLLs ≥40 µg/dL among adults with BLLs ≥25 µg/dL were painting and paper hanging; bridge, tunnel, and elevated highway construction; copper foundries; special trade contractors; and heavy construction industries (Table) . Nonoccupational exposures accounted for 337 (4.0%) and 328 (4.6%) of all adult cases in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The most common nonoccupational exposures were from shooting firearms; remodeling, renovating, or painting; retained bullets; and lead casting (Table) . What are the implications for public health practice?
Measures to improve lead exposure surveillance and preventive interventions focused in the manufacturing, construction, and mining industries should be implemented by government agencies, employers, and worker-affiliated organizations.
(e.g., engineering and work practice controls, † † and respiratory protection). However, the decrease in rates also might reflect low employer compliance with testing and reporting requirements (6) . ABLES data also underscore that elevated BLLs among adults are almost exclusively an occupational health problem in the United States. Those states with higher rates of elevated BLLs might represent 1) states where higher proportions of workers are employed in high-risk industries (e.g., lead-related manufacturing, construction activities involving lead paint exposure, and lead mining), 2) states where workers in high-risk areas are less likely to be protected by engineering and workplace controls, or 3) states where greater compliance with testing requirements by employers and reporting requirements by laboratories result in larger numbers of reported cases of elevated BLLs. Similar to findings in previous years, the 2008 (8) .
The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, the number of adults with elevated BLLs reported to ABLES likely is underreported because some employers might not provide BLL testing to all lead-exposed workers as required by OSHA regulations and because some laboratories might not report all tests as required by state regulations (9) . Second, because denominators are the numbers of employed persons, aged ≥16 years, unemployed adults who might be at risk for lead exposure, although included in the numerator, are not included in the denominator. Third, although state ABLES programs ascertain the work-relatedness of a lead exposure by following up with laboratories, physicians, employers, or workers, the possibility of misclassification of occupational versus nonoccupational cases cannot be excluded. Finally, analyzing lead exposures using a threshold of 25 µg/dL likely underestimates harmful occupational lead exposure because lead-related toxicity can occur at levels as low as 5 µg/dL and the Healthy People 2020 target is set at 10 µg/dL Progress toward meeting the Healthy People 2020 target for reducing the prevalence of adults with BLLS ≥10 µg/dL from workplace lead exposures can be aided by improving 1) worker protection programs developed and maintained by employers § § ; 2) government activities such as ABLES programs, which can effectively intervene to prevent lead exposures and the OSHA National Emphasis Program to reduce lead exposure; 3) research and interventions by stakeholder organizations; and 4) education of the public regarding preventing nonoccupational exposures. Emphasis should be placed on those industries identified in this report with the highest numbers of workers with elevated BLLs: manufacturing of storage batteries, secondary smelting and refining of nonferrous metals, painting and paper hanging, and bridge, tunnel, and elevated highway construction.
Update on Vaccine-Derived Polioviruses -Worldwide, July 2009-March 2011
In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis worldwide (1) . The live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) has many advantages favoring its use in polio eradication: it is administered easily by mouth; confers intestinal immunity, making recent OPV recipients resistant to infection by wild polioviruses (WPVs); provides long-term protection against paralytic disease through durable humoral immunity; and is inexpensive. Despite its many advantages, OPV use carries the risk for occurrence of rare cases of vaccineassociated paralytic poliomyelitis among immunologically normal OPV recipients and their contacts and the additional risk for emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Because of these risks, OPV use will be discontinued worldwide once the goal of eradicating all WPV transmission is achieved. VDPVs can cause polio outbreaks in areas with low OPV coverage and can replicate for years in immunodeficient persons; therefore, strategies to strengthen global polio immunization and surveillance are needed to limit emergence of VDPVs (2). This report updates previous surveillance summaries (3,4) and describes VDPVs detected worldwide during July 2009-March 2011 and reported as of June 20, 2011. Three new outbreaks of circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs), ranging in size from six to 16 cases, were identified in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and India; three previously identified outbreaks in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Somalia continued through late 2010 or into 2011 and resulted in 355, 37, and 13 total cases, respectively; two countries experienced importations of cVDPVs from Nigeria; nine newly identified paralyzed immunodeficient persons in seven middle-income and developing countries were found to excrete VDPVs; and VDPVs were found among persons and environmental samples in 15 countries. With the use of alternate OPV formulations since 2005 (1) and with enhanced poliovirus surveillance sensitivity and laboratory screening, the number of identified cVDPV outbreaks per year has increased over time (2, 3) . To prevent VDPV emergence and spread, all countries should maintain high poliovirus vaccination coverage against all three poliovirus serotypes. Sensitive poliovirus surveillance to detect VDPVs will continue to increase in importance.
Properties of VDPVs
VDPVs can cause paralytic polio in humans and have the potential for sustained circulation. VDPVs resemble WPVs biologically (3) and differ from the majority of vaccine-related poliovirus (VRPV) isolates by having genetic properties consistent with prolonged replication or transmission. Because poliovirus genomes evolve at a rate of approximately 1% per year, VRPVs that differ from the corresponding OPV strain by >1% of nucleotide positions (usually determined by sequencing the genomic region that encodes the major viral surface protein [VP1]) are presumed to have replicated for at least 1 year in one or more persons after administration of an OPV dose. This is substantially longer than the normal period of vaccine virus replication of 4-6 weeks in an OPV recipient.
Three poliovirus serotypes exist: types 1, 2, and 3. Poliovirus isolates are grouped into three categories, based on the extent of divergence of the VP1 nucleotide region compared with the corresponding OPV strain: 1) VRPVs (<1% divergent [types 1 and 3] or <0.6% divergent [type 2]); 2) VDPVs (VRPVs that are >1% divergent [types 1 and 3] or >0.6% divergent [type 2] from the corresponding OPV strain); and 3) WPVs (no genetic evidence of derivation from any vaccine strain) (3). VDPVs are further categorized as 1) cVDPVs, when evidence of person-to-person transmission in the community exists; 2) immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs), which are isolated from persons with primary immunodeficiencies who have prolonged VDPV infections; and 3) ambiguous VDPVs (aVDPVs), which are either clinical isolates from persons with no known immunodeficiency or sewage isolates whose source is unknown (3).
Virologic Testing for VDPVs
All poliovirus isolates are characterized by laboratories of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (4). The original protocol to screen for VDPVs, using a combination of molecular and antigenic methods, largely has been replaced by a real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) nucleic acid amplification targeted to nucleotide substitutions that occur early in VDPV emergence (3) . Candidate VDPVs are sequenced in the VP1 region for routine analysis; the complete genome is sequenced if higher epidemiologic resolution is required.
cVDPVs
The number of countries with indigenous cVDPV emergence increased from three to six since the last reporting period (3), and VDPVs were imported from Nigeria into two countries. In all but one country the emerging cVDPVs were type 2 ( Figure) .
Afghanistan. Six type 2 cVDPV (cVDPV2) isolates (1.0%-1.2% divergent) were isolated during June 2010-January 2011 in the southern province of Helmand, where routine trivalent OPV (tOPV) coverage is low, and where WPV1 has circulated throughout the reporting period and WPV3 was DRC. The cVDPV2 outbreak in DRC continued through 2010, with a total of 37 cases detected. Since July 2009, a total of 17 cVDPV2 isolates (0.7%-3.5% divergent) from AFP cases have been detected in five provinces. Five additional aVDPV2 isolates (0.7%-1.4% divergent) from AFP patients were detected in three of these provinces. Multiple independent cVDPV2 and aVDPV2 emergences occurred in DRC.
Ethiopia. Seven cVDPV3 isolates (1.3%-3.1% divergent) were isolated from AFP patients in three overlapping VDPV3 outbreaks that emerged independently in three central regions.
India. Sixteen cVDPV2 isolates (1.0%-1.6% divergent), representing four independent emergences, were isolated from AFP patients in Uttar Pradesh. The cVDPV2 cases clustered in districts of western Uttar Pradesh that previously had been at high risk for WPV1 and WPV3 circulation (5) . Although all patients had received >7 mOPV1 doses in SIAs, <50% had received a tOPV dose.
Niger. One cVDPV2 (2.5% divergent) was isolated from a patient in southwestern Niger with onset of AFP in June 2010. The isolate was closely related to a cVDPV circulating in neighboring Sokoto State, Nigeria. As with the four previous cVDPV2 importations from Nigeria detected since May 2006 (3), no secondary cases were found in Niger.
Nigeria. Since 2005, a total of 355 AFP cases associated with an outbreak of cVDPV2 (0.7%-6.2% divergent) have been reported in 11 northern and three central states of Nigeria (3, 6, 7) . The outbreak peaked at 153 cases in 2009, but 27 cases were detected in 2010, and five cases (representing three transmission chains) were detected through March 2011. Genetic analysis indicated that detected cases represent at least seven concurrent outbreaks arising from multiple Abbreviations: cVDPV = circulating VDPV; iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated VDPV; aVDPV = ambiguous VDPV; AFP = acute flaccid paralysis. * Spread of cVDPVs followed the elimination of the corresponding serotype of indigenous wild poliovirus, but with continued introduction of oral poliovirus vaccine into communities with growing immunity gaps. All of the cVDPV outbreaks were detected first by the laboratory, using sequence data and evolutionary analyses. 
FIGURE. Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) detected -worldwide, July 2009-March 2011

iVDPVs
Since the introduction of OPV in 1961, approximately 50 persons with B-cell immunodeficiencies have been found worldwide to be excreting iVDPVs (indicating prolonged infections), most of which were detected only after the onset of AFP. Intensified surveillance for VDPVs and special studies of iVDPV excretion among persons with primary immunodeficiencies in developing and middle-income countries have resulted in an increase in recognized iVDPV infections, from two in the previous reporting period (3) to nine currently, seven of which were associated with iVDPV2. New iVDPV infections will occur as long as OPV is used and no effective therapies to clear iVDPV infections are available.
Algeria. A girl aged 1.5 years with HLA-DR-associated immunodeficiency, who had received 2 OPV doses, developed AFP in April 2010, and died in November 2010 from complications of immunodeficiency; iVDPV2 (1.0%-1.8% divergent) was isolated from four consecutive stool specimens.
China. An iVDPV2 (1.9% divergent) was isolated from a girl aged 9 years with primary immunodeficiency, and an iVDPV3 (2.0% divergent) was isolated from a boy aged 2 years with primary immunodeficiency. Both patients had received 3 OPV doses, and both developed AFP in February 2011.
Colombia. A boy aged 15 months with agammaglobulinemia who had received 4 OPV doses in his first months of life, developed AFP in July 2009, 15 months after receipt of the first OPV dose; iVDPV2 (1.5% divergent) was isolated from two consecutive stool specimens.
India. A boy aged 11 years with common variable immunodeficiency who had received 4 OPV doses, developed AFP in September 2009, 5 years after receipt of the most recent OPV dose; iVDPV1 (4.1% divergent) was isolated from two consecutive stool specimens. A child aged 10 years with primary immunodeficiency who had received 19 OPV doses developed AFP in January 2010; iVDPV2 (1.2% divergent) was isolated from two consecutive stool specimens.
Iraq. A boy aged 8 months who showed signs of primary immunodeficiency (multiple infections) and had received 6 OPV doses developed AFP in December 2010; iVDPV2 (1.2% divergent) was isolated from stool specimens taken within a week of AFP onset. The child had no residual paralysis when examined 60 days after AFP onset but died 2 weeks later from acute severe bronchiolitis.
Sri Lanka. An iVDPV2 (1.3% divergent) was isolated in 2010 from a boy aged 8 months diagnosed with severe combined immunodeficiency who had received 3 OPV doses but had not developed AFP.
Turkey. An iVDPV2 (1.8% divergent) was isolated in 2011 from a boy aged 1 year with primary immunodeficiency who had received 1 OPV dose but had not developed AFP. (Table) . Descriptions of the most divergent aVDPVs, all from sewage samples in countries with high rates of polio vaccination coverage, follow. Despite follow-up investigations in all three countries, the persons infected with the corresponding aVDPVs have not been identified. In settings of low poliovirus vaccine coverage, aVDPVs might signal cVDPV emergence and potential gaps in surveillance.
Estonia. Highly divergent (13.5%-15.8%) aVDPV2s were isolated through late 2010 and are related to sewage isolates detected previously in Estonia (3).
Finland. Highly divergent (12.4%-14.6%) aVDPV1s, aVDPV2s, and aVDPV3s were isolated from sewage samples collected during July 2009-October 2010 (8) . The isolates were related to aVDPVs detected previously and unrelated to the Estonian aVDPVs (3). Of 13 samples collected, 11 contained heterotypic VDPV mixtures sharing similar degrees of divergence from the parental OPV strains, consistent with the source being a person chronically infected with iVDPVs of all three serotypes.
Israel. Sewage samples from the Tel Aviv area (sampling populations of approximately 350,000 and 10,000) yielded two genetically distinct groups of type 2 aVDPVs (9 
Editorial Note
The three categories of VDPVs differ in their public health importance. First, cVDPVs have recovered the biologic properties of WPVs and have the potential to circulate for years in settings where polio vaccination coverage to prevent that particular type is low. In addition, for each case detected, another 100-1,000 asymptomatic infections occur among susceptible children, as is the case for WPVs (10) . Second, iVDPVs can be excreted for many years by persons with certain primary immunodeficiencies, and some chronic infections are latent. Many persons with prolonged iVDPV infections either spontaneously clear the infections or die from the complications of immunodeficiency. Nonetheless, in the absence of effective antiviral therapy, persons infected with iVDPVs without paralysis are at risk for developing paralytic poliomyelitis and might infect others with poliovirus, posing a risk for outbreaks in areas with low polio vaccination coverage. Third, aVDPVs are heterogeneous; some represent the initial isolates from cVDPV outbreaks, especially in areas with type-specific immunity gaps, and aVDPVs isolated during cVDPV outbreaks of the same serotype might be cVDPVs whose progenitors or progeny were not detected. Other aVDPVs, such as those detected in sewage in Estonia, Finland, and Israel, probably are iVDPVs from latent chronic infections. Still other aVDPVs, especially those with limited divergence, might represent limited spread of OPV virus or the upper limit of OPV divergence in a single normal vaccine recipient or contact.
The detection in Nigeria of numerous isolates with <1% divergence that were ancestral to cVDPV2 lineages (7) prompted a redefinition of VDPV2 for purposes of reporting by the Global Polio Laboratory Network to include isolates with >0.6% divergence and was applied beginning in 2010.
The increased frequency of VDPV detection compared with the previous reporting period (3) is attributable partly to increased surveillance sensitivity and improved laboratory methods. However, for cVDPVs, the most important factor is the growth of type-specific immunity gaps in areas with low routine vaccination, arising from the intensive use of mOPV1 and bOPV in SIAs. These alternative OPV formulations, by eliminating interference from the type 2 OPV strain, are more effective than tOPV in inducing higher levels of population immunity to WPV1 and WPV3. Their use in endemic and outbreak countries has facilitated WPV control. In settings of inadequate routine vaccination coverage with tOPV, conditions develop that favor multiple independent VDPV2 emergences, as occurred in DRC, India, Nigeria, and Somalia. Emergence of cVDPV3 appears to be rare but occurred in areas of low tOPV coverage in Ethiopia after a cVDPV2 emergence in 2008 (3).
Current and past experiences underscore the importance of robust routine vaccination with tOPV (or, alternatively, inactivated poliovirus vaccine) to prevent VDPV emergence and spread as well as to prevent WPV transmission. In countries with low routine vaccination coverage, closing the immunity gaps to all three poliovirus serotypes by periodic but regular use of tOPV in SIAs is essential to prevent cVDPV emergence (3). Maintenance of sensitive AFP surveillance also is crucial; any temporal and geographic clustering of vaccine-related isolates of the same serotype should prompt further investigation.
Notes from the Field
Multiple Cases of Measles After Exposure During Air Travel -Australia and New Zealand, January 2011
In January 2011, measles was diagnosed in three New Zealand residents recently returned from a 17-day trip to Singapore and the Philippines. On January 11, they had flown on a 7.5-hour flight from Singapore to Brisbane, Australia, remained in a transit lounge for 9.5 hours, and then continued on a 4-hour flight to Auckland, New Zealand. Searches in Australia and New Zealand for secondary cases among passengers on either flight resulted in the identification of three cases among passengers on the Singapore-to-Brisbane flight and five cases among passengers on the Brisbane-to-Auckland flight.
The three index cases had rash onsets occurring January 11-15 and tested positive for measles immunoglobulin M (IgM). One Australian case and one New Zealand case were diagnosed clinically, but the remaining six secondary cases, with rash onsets occurring January 21-26, were positive for measles RNA by nucleic acid amplification testing. Each specimen was genotype D9 with the same genetic sequence. Only three of the eight secondary cases were in persons seated within two rows of a person with an index case: two in unvaccinated persons and one in a person whose measles vaccination status was unknown. One secondary case was in a person of unknown vaccination status seated four rows away from the nearest person with an index case, one was in a person with a history of having been vaccinated against measles twice who was seated six rows away, and three were in unvaccinated children 11 rows away, in a separate cabin. The three index cases were in unvaccinated children aged 12-17 years.
Australian contact investigation guidelines for exposure to a single passenger with infectious measles aboard an aircraft focus on the seats within two rows of persons with index cases (1); five of the eight secondary cases in this outbreak were in persons who were farther away. Three persons likely were infectious aboard the aircraft, not one, and recent literature suggests that exposure might extend farther than two rows (2,3). In addition, because measles is readily transmissible through airborne transmission, the opportunity for exposure existed in the jetways, the arrival and departure terminals, and the transit lounge. This outbreak highlights the transmissibility of measles and the risk for exposure during international travel, which might start at the airport before departure, and the need for travelers to be protected against measles by vaccination.
Errata: Vol. 60, No. 21
In the report "HIV Surveillance -United States, 1981-2008," populations identified in the text as white, black or African American, Asian or Pacific Islander, or American Indian or Alaska Native, should have been further identified as non-Hispanic. In the table on page 692, Hispanic/Latino should have been included under Race/Ethnicity and a footnote added saying: Persons in the four racial populations all were non-Hispanic. Persons of Hispanic/Latino ethnicity might be of any race.
* Based on parental response to the following question: "Has a representative from a school or a health professional ever told you that [child] had a learning disability?" † White and black children are non-Hispanic children with a single race reported. Hispanic children might be of any race. § Family income group is based on family income and family size using the U.S. Census Bureau poverty thresholds. Family income was imputed when information was missing, using multiple imputation methodology. ¶ Estimates were based on household interviews of a sample of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. Denominators for each category exclude persons for whom data were missing. ** 95% confidence interval.
During 2007-2009, among children with family incomes <100% of the poverty level, non-Hispanic white children (16%) and non-Hispanic black children (13%) were more likely to have ever received a diagnosis of learning disability than Hispanic children (9%). Among those with family income 100%-199% of the poverty level, the percentage with a learning disability was higher for non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black children (both 12%) than for Hispanic children (8%). Among children with family income ≥200% of the poverty level, non-Hispanic white children (8%) were more likely to have been diagnosed with learning disability than Hispanic children (5%). For children in all three racial/ethnic groups, the percentage of children ever receiving a diagnosis of learning disability decreased as family income increased. Table II. † † Updated weekly from reports to the Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. Since October 3, 2010, 112 influenza-associated pediatric deaths occurring during the 2010-11 influenza season have been reported. § § The one measles case reported for the current week was imported. ¶ ¶ Data for meningococcal disease (all serogroups) are available in Table II Table II Guam  -3  81  189  481  -0  0  -NN  -0  0  --Puerto Rico  164  105  349  3, Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). -35  454 Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). § Dengue Fever includes cases that meet criteria for Dengue Fever with hemorrhage, other clinical and unknown case classifications. ¶ DHF includes cases that meet criteria for dengue shock syndrome (DSS), a more severe form of DHF. ** Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). 2  3  18  51  90  2  1  5 18 Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Cumulative total E. ewingii cases reported for year 2010 = 10, and 2 cases reported for 2011 § Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). 6  25  55  430  715  54  99  206  2,201  2,535  1  4  12  92  90  Connecticut  2  5  12  93  130  -40  150  823  1,183  -1  6  27  18  Maine  §  3  3  11  52  86  -2  7  72  97  1  0  2  13  6  Massachusetts  -13  25  176  306  47  48  80  1,078  1,025  -2  6  37  48  New Hampshire  -2  10  37  81  1  3  7  61  70  -0  2  8  7  Rhode Island  §  -1  7  7  35  6  5  15  144  132  -0  2  3  7  Vermont  §  1  3  10  65  77  -0  8  23  28  -0  3 Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Data for H. influenzae (age <5 yrs for serotype b, nonserotype b, and unknown serotype) are available in Table I . § Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). -0  5  8  3  -0  8  28  43  -0  8  10  36  Puerto Rico  -0  2  2  9  -0  3  4 1  9  22  170  244  45  57  178  930  1,354  9  7  41  168  165  Delaware  -0  2  3  8  -10  32  247  340  -0  1  2  2  District of Columbia  -0  3  4  12  -1  5  9  14  -0  1  5  7  Florida  -3  9  69  73  2  1  8  31  24  3  2  7  44  52  Georgia  -1  4  9  33  -0  2  4  5  2  1  7  33  27  Maryland  †  -1  6  25  54  18  17  103  316  612  2  1  21  38  28  North Carolina  -1  6  28  22  -0  9  18  33  -0  13  14  18  South Carolina  †  -0  2  5  7  -0  3  5  18  -0  1  1  3  Virginia  †  1  1  9  22  30  25  19  82  283  294  2  1  5  31  28  West Virginia  -0  2  5  5  -0  29  17  14  -0  1 -- -2  9  65  65  -0  3  15  24  -0  3  11  11  Alabama  †  -0  2  10  7  -0  2  5  --0  1  3  2  Kentucky  -0  4  12  11  -0  1  -2  -0  1  4  3  Mississippi  -0  3  8  9  -0  0  ---0  2  1  -Tennessee  †  -1  7  35  38  -0  3  10  22  -0  2  3  6 W.S. Central  2  3  13  41  56  -1  29  16  42  -1  18  21  37  Arkansas  †  -0  2  3  9  -0  0  ---0  1  2  1  Louisiana  -0  3  6  2  -0  1  ---0  1  -1  Oklahoma  -0  2  2  6  -0  0  ---0  1  2  3  Texas  †  2  2  11  30  39  -1  29  16  42  -1  17  17  32   Mountain  2  2  10  43  77  -0  3  5  9  1  1  4  31  26  Arizona  1  1  7  16  20  -0  1  3  2  -0  4  14  11  Colorado  -0  2  4  16  -0  1  1  -1  0  3  11  9  Idaho  †  1  0  1  4 5  5  21  131  127  2  3  11  68  78  2  4  10  65  54  Alaska  -0  2  ---0  1  -2  -0  2  3  2  California  5  4  15  117  110  2  2  9  50  51  -2  10  46  31  Hawaii  -0  1  1  1  N  0  0  N  N  -0  1  2  2  Oregon  -0  3  4  7  -0  3  18  21  -0  3  5  5  Washington  -0  6  9  9  -0  4  -4  2  0  5  9 14 3  2  8  74  81  -0  4  10  37  19  36  106  611  646  Delaware  -0  1  1  --0  0  ---0  2  10  6  District of Columbia  -0  1  ---0  1  -2  -0  2  2  3  Florida  2  1  5  32  39  -0  2  2  8  6  5  15  132  131  Georgia  -0  2  4  6  -0  2  1  2  3  4  13  85  92  Maryland  §  1  0  1  7  4  -0  1  1  8  -2  6  39  55  North Carolina  -0  3  12  9  -0  2  4  5  3  3  35  101  133  South Carolina  §  -0  1  7  7  -0  1  -3  5  5  25  74  143  Virginia  §  -0  2  9  14  -0  2  2  7  2  7  41  123  74  West Virginia  -0  1  2  2  -0  0  -2  -1  41  45  9 E.S. Central  -1  3  17  21  -0  1  3  9  1  12  35  171  373  Alabama  §  -0  2  9  4  -0  1  1  6  -3  11  67  111  Kentucky  -0  1  -8  -0  0  -1  -3  16  42  131  Mississippi  -0  1  2  3  -0  1  2  --1  10  8  31  Tennessee  §  -0  2  6  6  -0  1  -2  1  3  11  54  100 W.S. Central  -1  12  31  50  1  1  15  44  42  19  40  297  463  1,411  Arkansas  §  -0  1  7  5  -0  1  1  3  1  2  18  29  71  Louisiana  -0  2  5  11  -0  2  -4  -1  3  10  21  Oklahoma  -0  2  5  12  -0  1  1  --0  92  17  12  Texas  §  -1  10  14  22  1  1  14  42  35  18  34  187  407  1,307   Mountain  1  1  4  33  36  -0  4  3  10  4  42  100  814  561  Arizona  -0  2  8  9  -0  1  -4  -14  29  341  199  Colorado  1  0  2  8  12  -0  1  2  5  3  10  63  245  61  Idaho  §  -0  1  3  5  -0  1  --1  2  15  42  77  Montana  §  -0  2  3  1  -0  0  ---2  16  61  32  Nevada  §  -0  1  3  5  -0  1  ---0  7  15  8  New Mexico  §  -0  1  1  3  -0  2  1  --3  11  58  37  Utah  -0  2  7  1  -0  1  -1  -5  16  49  141  Wyoming  §  -0  1  ---0  1  ---0  2  3  6   Pacific  -4  26  100  90  -0  3  8  28  10  137  1,710  1,207  1,354  Alaska  -0  1  1  1  -0  1  1  1  -0  6  16  12  California  -2  17  69  56  -0  3  2  18  1  120  1,569  930  1,101  Hawaii  -0  1  3  1  -0  1  2  2  -1  6  17  30  Oregon  -0  3  16  18  -0  1  3  1  -5  11  96  140  Washington  -0  8  11  14  -0  1  -6  9  12  131  148 71 Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Data for meningococcal disease, invasive caused by serogroups A, C, Y, and W-135; serogroup B; other serogroup; and unknown serogroup are available in Table I . § Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
Mid. Atlantic
2 1 8 12 41 18 4 17 45 74 -0 2 1 6 New Jersey -0 6 -32 -0 6 -36 -0 0 -1 New York (Upstate) 2 0 7 8 6 18 3 14 37 36 -0 2 1 4 New York City -0 2 4 2 -0 3 8 2- 0 0 - - Pennsylvania - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 E.N. Central - 0 4 8 19 - 1 45 3 248 - 0 6 13 18 Illinois - 0 2 5 8 - 0 2 - 1 - 0 1 2 3 Indiana - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 3 9 7 Michigan - 0 1 1 - - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 1 - Ohio - 0 3 2 1 - 0 1 1 - - 0 0 - - Wisconsin - 0 1 - 10 - 1 45 2 246 - 0 3 1 8 W.N. Central - 1 13 28 54 - 2 77 6 346 - 0 11 9 2 Iowa N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Kansas - 0 2 2 2 - 0 1 - - - 0 0 - - Minnesota - 0 12 - - - 1 75 1 343 - 0 11 - - Missouri - 0 13 26 52 - 0 2 5 3 - 0 3 8 2 Nebraska § - 0 1 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 1 1 - North Dakota N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N South Dakota - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - -
S. Atlantic
26 - 0 1 1 1 Delaware - 0 2 7 9 - 0 1 1 2 - 0 0 - - District of Columbia N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Florida - 0 3 10 4 - 0 1 3 1 - 0 0 - - Georgia - 0 3 5 14 - 0 1 5 1 - 0 1 1 1 Maryland § 1 0 3 7 9 1 0 2 1 8 - 0 1 - - North Carolina - 0 13 7 31 - 0 4 6 10 - 0 0 - - South Carolina § - 0 1 - 2 - 0 1 - - - 0 0 - - Virginia § 1 1 8 15 20 1 0 2 2 4 - 0 1 - - West Virginia - 0 1 - 1 - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - E.S. Central 2 0 11 16 31 - 0 2 5 5 - 0 1 1 7 Alabama § - 0 3 - 4 - 0 2 2 1 N 0 0 N N Kentucky - 0 2 3 4 - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - 1 Mississippi - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 - 1 - 0 0 - 1 Tennessee § 2 0 7 13 22 - 0 2 3 3 - 0 1 1 5 W.S. Central - 0 87 - 9 - 0 9 - - - 0 1 - - Arkansas § - 0 5 - - - 0 2 - - - 0 0 - - Louisiana - 0 0 - 1 - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Oklahoma - 0 82 - 7 - 0 7 - - - 0 0 - - Texas § - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - - Mountain - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 1 2 - Arizona - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 1 2 - Colorado N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Idaho § N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Montana § N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Nevada § N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N New Mexico § N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Utah - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Wyoming § - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Pacific - 0 1 - 1 - 0 0 - - - 0 1 1 2 Alaska N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N California - 0 1 - 1 - 0 0 - - - 0 1 1 2 Hawaii N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Oregon - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Washington - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Territories American Samoa N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Puerto Rico N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.Territories American Samoa - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 1 - 1 - 0Territories American Samoa - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam15 - 0 1 - 1 - 0 3 - 4 Nebraska † - 0 1 - 5 1 0 2 2 3 - 0 1 2 8 North Dakota - 0 1 1 2 - 0 10 - - - 0 1 - - South Dakota - 0 2 1 4 - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 - 2
E.S. Central
1 - 0 2 - 2 - 0 1 1 - Montana † - 0 1 - 4 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 Nevada † - 0 2 8 15 - 0 1 - - - 0 2 3 2 New Mexico † - 0 2 3 2 - 0 2 1 3 - 0 1 2 - Utah - 0 2 7 15 - 0 1 - 2 - 0 0 - 3 Wyoming † - 0 2 1 4 - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - PacificTerritories American Samoa N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N - 0 0 - - C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 1 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Puerto Rico - 0 1 - 1 N 0 0 N N - 0 1 - 4 U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.
S. Atlantic
Territories American Samoa - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 0 - - - 3 15 12 374 - 0 14 31 - Puerto Rico - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 1 1 1 U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.
Territories
American -0  6  18  23  -7  25  40  254  -0 Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Illnesses with similar clinical presentation that result from Spotted fever group rickettsia infections are reported as Spotted fever rickettsioses. Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) caused by Rickettsia rickettsii, is the most common and well-known spotted fever. § Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). 2  3  26  142  103  -0  3  11  11  6  3  10  90  121  Louisiana  -3  11  97  60  -0  2  8  16  -8  36  167  199  Oklahoma  N  0  0  N  N  N  0  0  N  N  -1  6  25  48  Texas  §  15  27  333  867  955  1  3  27  79  120  -23  33  488  577  Mountain  10  32  72  1,084  1,092  -3  8  82  153  2  12  24  233  255  Arizona  7  12  44  518  537  -1  5  38  70  2  4  9  74  100  Colorado  2  11  23  336  318  -1  4  25  44  -2  8  51  60  Idaho -0  16  -1  -0  3  --Arkansas  ¶  -3  17  119  116  -0  3  ---0  1  --Louisiana  -2  5  45  42  -0  3  ---0  1  --Oklahoma  N  0  0  N  N  -0  1  ---0  0  --Texas  ¶  22  37  247  1,071  1,539  -0  15  -1  -0  2  --Mountain  4  14  50  373  655  -0  18  -9  -0  15  -10  Arizona  -0  0  ---0  13  -9  -0  9  -6  Colorado  ¶  4  6  31  143  230  -0  5  ---0  11  -4  Idaho  ¶  N  0  0  N  N  -0  0  ---0  1  --Montana  ¶  -2  28  92  133  -0  0  ---0 Table IV , which appears quarterly. † Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for California serogroup, eastern equine, Powassan, St. Louis, and western equine diseases are available in Table I . § Not reportable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not reportable are excluded from this table, except starting in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases and influenzaassociated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/osels/ph_surveillance/nndss/phs/infdis.htm. ¶ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
